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that bank even if you were to promise its manager a very much higher 
interest rate than the current basic rate, which the bank charges the 
others. Here, willingness to "hold" any portion of potential money 
supply, by the households' sector is checked by the absence of an 
acceptable collateral to the bank. A rich household, by definition, is 
in no need to borrow. 
As far as the nonbank business sector is concerned, the issue 
would be clear once neoclassical theology is discarded. 
7.5.2 Expansionary monetary policy and the leader firm's level of 
output: 
Assumptions: Assume that the economy is stuck in a state of 
unemployment/'excess capacity equilibrium, "business confidence" being so 
low that no planned net addition to the stock of physical (fixed) capital 
is taking place. Assume that all commodity prices - assumed to be 
mark-up determined - are unchanging. Assume also that government's bonds 
(issued by the treasury) are the only alternative financial asset 
available to holding money; and the banking system observes the legal 
minimum reserves ratio. Finally, assume the economy is closed. 
Granted that, we may now address the following question: Given 
the binding collateral constraint for the households sector, how can an 
expansionary monetary policy induce the leader firm to increase its 
current level of output, hence employment ? 
Consider first figure 12 below: 177 
Notes to Chapter 7 
^Keynes (1936), ch.l7; See also, Davidson (1978), Ch.6. 
^But see Benston (1982). 
shall maintain the simplifying assumption that the financial system is 
identical to the banking system, with the latter being composed of 
clearing banks and the central bank. The latter is assumed to stand for 
the monetary authority. This means we have to abstract from 
insurance companies, building societies, investment trusts, etc. The 
Treasury is here treated as separate from the financial system. 
'^See Laidler (1982), Ch.4; Tobin (1978); and McKenzie (1979). 
^Hicks (1979), pp.vii-viii (emphasis added). 
^Sraffa (1926), especially pp.549-550. 
^Kalecki (1937); Kalecki (1971), Chs. 5 and 9. 
^May I say that this reconstruction of Kalecki's argument is based on a 
reference to Sraffa (1926) Kalecki made in his article of 1939. "Money And 
Real Wages", published in english in his book. Studies In The Theory Of 
Business Cycles, 1933-1939 (Basil Blackwell) in 1966. His reference 
to Sraffa, on page 52 (footnote), in that book, implies that Kalecki had 
not been fully satisfied with Sraffa's implicit argument (Sraffa, 1926, 
p.550) that positive demand prospects lead to automatic availability of 
bank loans. 
^One wonders whether Rowan's diagrammatical analysis on the determination 
of the volume of investment could have been improved upon by Kalecki's 
1937, "The principle of Increasing Risk, Economica, Vol.IV, No.13-16; see 
Rowan, D.C., 1983, Output, Inflation, and Growth, 3rd Ed., Macmillan, 
London, p.155. 
l^compare Binks (1979) with Kalecki (1937, especially pp.442-442). See 
also Sardoni (1984). 
^^Firm's size is measured by the replacement (i.e. the current) cost of its 
productive capacity under the current economic climate. 189 
system, at the beginning of period t-1 . The difference between 
industry 1 and the other two industries, as far as the inflationary 
effect of Aw is concerned, is that when a^^j = 0 all Aw would be passed to 
price in industries 2 and 3 in a single standard period while in 
industry 1 it must take n+1 standard periods. In the case when a^j ^ 
0, the inflationary effect of a once and for all increase in w would be 
fully performed over a longer period of time as we shall see below. In 
the case when all firms follow the replacement cost pricing (RCP) rule, 
the full inflationary effect of a once and for all increase in w will 
be worked out in a single standard period. The proof is lengthy, but not 
difficult, and may be described as follows: 
Let us take the above system and lag everv term on the right hand 
side of each process bv the relevant number of standard periods in such a 
way that for each price equation of each process, whether it is of 
fictitious good or not, it is brought up to period t . If this 
operation were conducted, then the new price system would be as follows: 
" (8.16.1) 
""i'f's.n-l.t-! " 'I'Vl "'"""l > (8:i6,n) 
" ^nn^l.t " 190 
= Pl.t (S.lt.n.l) 
(*12^1,t-l ^ *22^2,t-l ^2,t (8.17) 
(*13^1.t-l *23^2,t-l ^3,t (8.18) 
Suppose that the rate of price inflation has been zero for a 
number of standard periods larger than n+1, and that all finns have 
already decided that in the face of any 'cost' increases, the HCP rule is 
to be applied. Suppose further that the working class is so weak that 
they are powerless to influence the money wage rate whatever the value of 
AP 
— . where P is a relevant price index. Under these circumstances 
an increase in r^ (for whatever reason; at the beginning of period t 
will lead to the following inflationary process: 
From the beginning of period t , P^ increases by a certain 
percentage. Since it is used as an input in the ficticious process 
1 , It would led to an increase in the price of the fictitious 
outputs b^^and a^ ^. That increase will materialize at the 
beginning of period t+1. This in turn leads to an increase in 
2 
the price of the ficticious outputs ^ at the beginning of 
period t+2 . After n+1 standard periods, the price of the final 
commodity . 1 will go up in response to the increase in the prices of 
the ficticious outputs b which took place at the beginning of 
period t+n-1. 194 
with higher rate of price inflation per standard period than the case 
when HCP rule is being applied. I think the issue is clear enough to 
need no further elaboration.^ 
The answer to the second question (page 191 above) is more 
interesting. 
Here the effect of the switch from HCP to RCP rule on the rate of 
price inflation (per standard period, of course) depends on a number of 
factors. They are the following: 
(a) The number and the size of the finri(s) that switch from HCP to RCP 
rule. 
(b"i The speed of the switch from HCP rate to RCP rule 
A gradual switch from HCP rule to RCP rule introduces a gradual 
increase in the rate of price inflation. This very fact can initiate the 
state of hyper-inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the above formulation 
is used to analyse the inflationary process in a system when HCP is the 
rule compared with another system where RCP is the rule. 
Whatever is the degree of realism or unrealism of the above 
formulation, its more realistic version conveys the same message. The 
main differences are two. First the mark-up formulation of the "more 
realistic" price system is less clear cut. Second the mark-up mechanism 
(see below) embodies an indirect treatment of the same issues raised 
here, but in a less clear cut fashion. For this reason, the switch 
hypothesis is discussed in this section. The implication of the above 
argument is that, at the early stages of the inflationary phenomenon at 
least, the rate of price inflation measured with reference to each 
standard period is lowest when the predominant rule of pricing is the 
historic pricing rule. On the other hand, a shift from historic cost 208 
argument can be extended to cover a more general system. (2) the presence 
of fixed capital and multiperiod production processes (in the present 
closed economy model) do not invalidate the conclusion that in an 
advanced capitalist econom\^ price inflation is initiated either by higher 
mark-up or by higher money wage rate. I shall say a little more on the 
mark-up as a link in section 8.3. below. 
8.2. Fixed capital and multiperiod production processes introduced into 
the physical system: 
The aim of this section is to move one step further in the 
attempt at tracing the links between the price level and the level of 
employment, and as a result to trace the relationship between the rate of 
price inflation and the rate of unemployment. It is a preparatory 
section which serves the following two sections. 
We start by approaching the problem of introducing fixed capital 
and multiperiod production processes into the circulating capital 
physical system in two steps. In the first step we abstract from fixed 
capital and concentrate the analysis on a production system which 
incorporates a single multiperiod production process. In the second step 
we introduce fixed capital into the latter system. 
8.2.1. The physical system, with a multiperiod production process but 
no fixed capital: 
At the beginning of the last section I argued that the assumption 
that production period is the same for each industry is unrealistic. One 
piece of evidence on that comes from U.K. manufacturing where the ratio 
of maximum production period (for Electrical Engineering Industry) to the 
minimum production period (Clothing and Footwear Industry) is 2.5 221 
Notes to Chapter 8 
useful introductory material on the introduction of fixed capital into 
the circulating capital price system is found in Mainwaring (1984), Ch.ll, 
For a more complicated analysis, see: Roncaglia (1978), pp.36-48, and 
Baldone (1980). 
^This section is heavily dependent on Morishima (1969), Ch, VI. 
^The reader is reminded that a"j, i", and P? do not mean a^j, 
Jtj and Pj each raised to the power n . n here is a superscript. 
^Morishima, ibid, pp. 91-92 
^The asumption that the machine is needed for the production of all the 
n+1 'goods' implies that a^| can replace a^j in any of the n+1 
processes (i j). This in turn necessitates the replacement of the 
first n+1 equations by (n+1)^ equations. Such expansion of the above 
system complicates things without adding any thing substantial. As a 
result we have abstracted from that complication (see appendix 6 for 
the matrix formulation of the price system of a simple case). In any 
case, if the system were in a state of equilibrium, the number of 
processes must be equal to the number of prices. This theorem reduces 
the number of equations considerably. See: Mainwaring, Ibid., pp. 
135-143. 
^The reader is referred to appendix (6) for the matrix formulation of 
the above system under the assumption that n=3. 
^In Harcourt (1982), pp.28-32, a similar conclusion is arrived at via a 
simplified, shorter and self contained treatment, though in a different 
context. There, the reader finds analysis in terms of level 
differences of commodity prices (at each point in time) resulting from 
the application of HCP rule in one hypothetical economy and the 
application of RCP rule in another economy identical to the first in 
all other aspects. 
®See appendix (7) for derivations. 
^The following analysis is almost entirely based on Coutts, K. et al, 
(1978), Ch.3. 
l^See appendix 8 
^^See appendix 9. 
l^Sylos-Labini, (1974), pp.5-7; see also ch.5, equations 5.23 and 5.24. 
l^op.cit. 
^•^Chapter 5, pp. 115-119 and Weiss (1974). 
l^see Coutts, K. et.al,(1978), Ch.5. 
l^Bird (1983). 
^^See chapter 10, pp.264-268. 
^^See also Morishima (1984), pp.208-211. 227 
on rejecting the idea that the perfectly competitive market theory, and 
marginalism in general, should be the starting point. That rejection 
seems to me inevitable if one wants to model an advanced capitalist 
economy (which is by definition an open economy) in a way that 
approximates the relevant realities of that economy as a second step in 
the series of steps which are supposed to lead to (a) scientific 
knowledge on the laws according to which price inflation gets initiated, 
spreads, etc. (b) a set of policy prescriptions designed to control it 
without further injustice, i.e. without letting the distribution of 
national income change in such a way that one section of the society or 
another becomes worse off. 
9.3 A simplified theoretical analysis: 
The theoretical analysis presented below is limited to two cases: 
Case I, for the inflationary effect of a once and for all increase in the 
foreign currency price of the imported input under a regime of fixed 
exchange rate; Case II for the inflationary effect of devaluation. A 
more general case is deferred to the following section. 
9.3.1. Case I: A once and for all increase in the world price of one 
imported input 
We start this case by assuming that money wage rate, w, remains 
at its initial level during the period in which the economy undergoes a 
state of disequilibrium. Now, the assumption that materials and direct 
labour inputs per unit of output are constant in the short run^ means 
that the increase in P™ at the beginning of period t leads to a 247 
variable mark-ups; movements of finance capital; indirect taxes; and 
retail trade; into that simple system, complicate (and lengthen) things 
very much while adding little insight into what we have said so far. 
9.5 Summary and closing note: 
In this chapter, the closed economy assumption is relaxed. The 
simple model which we formulated in chapter 6 is expanded to incorporate 
essential elements of the open advanced capitalist economy. It has been 
shown that the open economy is more vulnerable to price inflation than the 
closed economy. Production technique, consumers' imports, and the 
exchange rate impose a degree of interdependence between capitalist 
centres and the rest of the world economy. This interdependence enlarges 
the set of factors which initiate, or change the speed of, price inflation 
in comparison with the set which belongs to the closed economy world. 
This important difference must be taken into consideration before adopting 
any policy measure for the control of inflation. We shall handle some 
policy issues in a later chapter. 254 
In the above table, the first five cases are no more than a gradual 
complication of a single case. In that case the initiation of the 
inflationary process is exclusively due to a once and for all increase in 
the mark-up in industry 1. I shall leave out the over discussed (in 
macro terms) case when the inflationary process is initiated by the 
workers' side of the conflict (=» g > 0, equation 10.2). As for the 
sixth case in the table it may be interpreted as a simple reprsentation 
of a purely post-Keynesian counter cyclical economic policy. 
10.3 Structural quantities, variables, and numerical values: 
From system 10.1-10.17, we obtain the following structural 
quantities, endogenous/exogenous variables, and purely endogenous 
variables. 
10.3.1 The Technical Co-efficients: 
^ij  = units of output of industry i needed to produce one unit of 
gross output of industry j, i,j = 1,2,3. 
(j = unit of necessary direct labour time per unit of gross output 
of industry j. j = 1,2,3. 
10.3.2 Proportions 
8j = the proportion of the aggregate wage bill which is spent on 
3 
commodity j; I 8^ =1 
j = l 
)*j = the proportion of capitalists' consumption spent on commodity 
3 
j ; Z X J = 1 
j = l 
ijij = the proportion of government expenditure on goods and servic  es 
4 
which goes to commodity j; X = 1 
j=l 260 
10.4.1 Case I: constant money wage rate; 
In the present case, the system's reaction to the aforesaid increase 
in the maik-up in industry 1 is as follows (table 7). 268 
May I reniind the reader that the analysis in the preceding 
paragraphs is based on a model in which there is only circulating 
capital ? However, the introduction of fixed capital into the analysis, 
by assuming that commodity 1 uses a machine produced by another industry 
(chapter 8 above) as well as material inputs and direct labour, imposes a 
capacity constraint on the output of industry 1. These complications 
together with the complications which follow from the opening of the 
economy do not affect the conclusion to which the above analysis leads. 
That conclusion is that, under oligopoly capitalism, a disequilibrium 
price vector implies a disequilibrium quantity vector. 
Thus, under the present case the data generated suggest that the 
model of price inflation proposed in this thesis does produce numbers 
with so:r;e economic sense. The once and for all increase in the mark-up 
in industry 1 initiated a mild inflationary process. That process is 
associated with a zero rate of wage inflation (column 12), a declining 
rate of price inflation (column 6) and a shift in income distribution in 
favour of profit (columns 20-22). The maintenance of governmental real 
demand at its initial level lies behind the sectoral redistribution of 
the lower level of the employed section of the labour force in favour of 
the government sector (columns 23-26). The factor which initiated the 
inflationary process is not the increase in "money supply" on which I am 
going to say more later. Rather, it is the increase in the mark-up in 
industry 1. 
Let us now see the reaction of the same system to the same 
disturbance under the second case. 
10.4.2 Case II: Simple wage indexation: 
First the data (Table 8): 276 
The reaction of the system to the same -increase in the mark-up in 
industry 1 is presented in table 10 below; 279 
The first feature of the present case is the declining rate 
of price/wage inflation (columns 6 and 12) regardless of its anticipation 
by the workers. The reason for that is simple. The assumption that 
otg and & are all less than one implies that the workers in industries 2 
and 3 and in the government sector are unable to fully recoup the real wage 
loss inflicted upon them by the higher mark-up. The second related 
feature of the present case is that the initial class conflict over 
income distribution is transformed via the inflationary spiral into a 
simultaneous inter-class and intra-class conflict over the distribution 
of the cake. The end result is (see columns 20-26) a two-dimensional 
change in income distribution. First, there is a change in income 
distribution in favour of profit (columns 21,22) Second, there is a 
change in the distribution of the aggregate wage bill in favour of the 
most powerful section of the working class (columns 23-26). Here, it is 
the weak sections in our hypothetical society which paid the price of a 
declining rate of price inflation. 
10.4.5 Case V: an accelerating rate of price inflation associated with 
a counter-cyclical government policy: 
The present case is the same as case III above except for one 
important complication (see table 6). Here, the government's economic 
policy is represented by the following reaction function: 
jP. 
m _ m t 
^It " ^l,t-l |p- L^t-1; 
(l^pU^_2) 0 < p < 1 (10.22'' 287 
The most prominent features of the system under the present case 
are three. Firstly, price equilibrium is associated with a more or less 
an unchanging inter-class income distribution (columns 20-22). 
Secondly, all physical quantities (except inventories) are expanding (all 
represented by column 18); and thirdly, the expanding economy is in a 
state of quantity disequilibrium. 
10,5 On causality in the analysis of price inflation: 
The analysis presented in chapters 6-9 together with the above 
simple simulations has two important implications for causality in the 
analysis of price inflation under today's capitalism. The first is 
related to the logical side of causality, away from the shield of 
econometrics. The second implication relates to the shield of 
econometrics itself. 
As for the logical side of causality, I propose that Addison et al's 
(1980) "remote" and "proximate" causes, and Cobham's (1981) "causal 
field" be replaced by clearer terms. The inter-industrial analvsis of 
price inflation, according to which conflict over income distribution 
resolves itself in price inflation, presents the reader with a field of 
causality which is composed of two sub sets. The first is the subset of 
initiating causes. Its elements are four:^ 
(i) the mark-up 
(ii) the money wage rate 
(iii) the exchange rate, and 
(iv) the foreign currency price of imported inputs and/or consumer 
goods. 
The second is the subset of causes which perpetuates or even worsens 
the inflationary experience. The elements of this subset of causes are 
four: 288 
(i) Real Wage Resistance 
(ii) Rigid Mark-up Resistance 
(iii) Switching pricing rules, and 
(iv) Rigid Foreign Resistance 
The recognition of that differentiation is important for "[t]he 
understanding of inflation...." (Lipsey, 1981) per se. It becomes more 
important when the analyst addresses the policy question for its control. 
This is so because the policy package designed to control price inflation 
cannot be implemented without involving the members of the society which 
is experiencing the phenomenon. 
In all the inflationary simulations presented above, the initiating 
factor was the (hidden) higher mark-up in industry 1. The perpetuating 
and/or the worsening causes were two. The first is the rigid mark-up 
resistance. The second is the Real Wage Resistance, which took various 
forms of wage indexation (cases II, III, IV and V). "Money supply" was 
neither an initiating cause nor a perpetuating cause. It was no more 
than a validating factor. Insufficient attention given to the mark-up' as 
an initiating cause has important theoretical and practical implications. 
It is easy for the analyst who has been kept in the dark about the 
Kalecki-Leontief-Sraffa approach to economic analysis to slip into the 
wrong causality in his study of the phenomenon. This can easily happen 
if the analvst has been brought up on (among others) a macroeconomic 
approach to the analysis of price inflation. Having gained confidence in 
macroeconomics and econometrics, when asked to "study" "inflation", he will 
almost certainly start with a chunk of aggregative indices similar to 
those generated under cases II. Ill, IV or V. Using his "human capital 
stock" of economics and econometrics, he will construct a 
macroeconometric "model" of price inflation. When his econometric 
results reach their "satisfactory" level, it is very likely that he moves 289 
to the next logical and dangerous step, the policv implications. The 
result of that big step would be a set of policy prescriptions to 
"control" the phenomena. The end result of that policy can be a greater 
degree of economic inequality, a larger poverty stricken section of the 
society, and as a result, more alienation, hopelessness and deprivation. 
Constraints of time and length force me to omit a section of this 
chapter which would have studied the modelling "value" of Sim's (1972) 
causality test and Mizon's (1984) encompassing test, using the data set 
generated under cases II-V above. I only say here that the aggregative 
indices of price inflation tell us nothing about what initiated the 
inflationary spiral in the first place. Since causality and encompassing 
tests are cased on these indices (mediated bv a reduced form 
formulation), they are in no way capable of identifying any of the 
initiating factors which lie underneath the increasing aggregative 
indices of inflation. Thus, the two "tests" are useless as far as the 
"identification" problem is concerned. One can even say that the 
application of procedural rationality to modelling price/wage inflation 
makes both "tests" redundant. If one were to insist on the idea that an 
improvement upon existing and competing "models of inflation" cannot be 
obtained without the encompassing "principle", then I would suggest a 
further look at section 4.5 of Chapter 4 above. 
10.6 Concluding note 
I conclude this chapter by summarizing my answers to the three 
questions addressed at its beginning. Firstly, the model of price 
inflation proposed in this thesis does work numerically making some 
nontheological economic sense. Secondly, price inflation and income 
distribution are inseparable. Thirdly, the Kalecki-Leontieff-Sraffa 
approach to economic analysis leads the analyst to a clearer causality 290 
field composed of two subsets: the subset of initiating factors and the 
subset of perpetuating and/or worsening factors. Since the initiating 
factors do not show themselves in the aggregative indices of inflation, 
the latter are useless in identifying the initiating set of causes. The 
inter-industrial analysis of price inflation is a powerful tool for 
identifying both subsets of the causality field. 901 
rotes to chF~>ter 10 
*See Ackley (1961), pp. 355-358. 
"Seromler (1984, p.138) used the same matrix and the same labour input 
vector to "...discuss the effect of changes in the coefficients of 
production on relative values and prices of production". 
^In all simulations, I paid no attention to stock appreciation in working ou-t 
the actual rate of profit in the capitalist sector. 
^The following diagram (and analysis) is based on the assumption that 
indifference curves (if one would like to believe in them) are L-shaped. 
That assumption is not a prerequisite for the conclusions reached. 
^In the next case I shall not pay attention to the similar employment 
effect which features in that case. The reader might wish to have a look 
at Goodwin's (1983a p.308) "note" for a concise but implicit analysis of 
the positive employment effect of a temporary shift in income distribution 
in favour of wages at less than full employment. 
'^'By identifying the mark-up with the "rate of return on bonds" Morishima 
(1964, especially pp.258-261) indirectly assumed that the nor.inal rate of 
interest is an initiating factor. 
^Many economists miss, neglect or even ignore this point emphasised by 
Means (1975). 295 
undertaken in two related directions. The first involves more 
relaxations of the assumptions upon which the model of this thesis is 
based. The result is, of course, a greater degree of generality of the 
model. For example, in every case analysed above, I maintained the 
assumption that workers' bargaining power, sectoral or otherwise, is 
unchanging. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption. The same thing 
applies to the mark-up. Also, liquidity shortage associated with a 
higher basic rate of interest leads the financially weaker firm.s either 
to bankruptcy or to merger with another bigger and stronger firm who 
introduces some "rationalization" into the former. In both cases the 
core of the system i.e. the input-output matrix, cannot remain the same, 
as is assumed throughout this thesis. When I introduced fixed capital in 
chapter S, I introduced it in a very simple fashion within the closed 
economy context. When I opened the economy in chapter 9, I abstracted 
from fixed capital and multiperiod production processes. These are 
examples of important abstractions which reveal important gaps in the 
model which need to be filled. This work must thus be taken as no more 
than a skeleton proposal. 
The other direction in which further research may be undertaken 
is of an empirical (preferably non-econometric) nature. For example, 
further research may be undertaken in order to get realistic answers to 
the following questions: how pervasive is the target rate of return 
pricing in British manufacturing and retailing today ? Do leading firms, 
in a given industry, switch from HCP to RCP when price inflation gets 
under way in the economy ? How do firms incorporate interest charges on 
working capital needs in their current production cost, and how do 
changes in those charges lead them to revise the planned level of current 
output produced by existing production facilities ? How do firms and 
trade unions form their price expectations, etc. ? These are examples of 296 
questions whose answers form separate research projects of different 
lengths. It would be of immense benefit to the students, to the 
responsible teachers, to the policy makers and to the society as a whole 
if a section of postgraduate students were to be engaged in research 
projects involving answers to questions of such a nature. 
I close this thesis by saying that price inflation is a serious 
subject. It is time for economists to take it more seriously. 




Some of the macroeconomic implications of a once and for all 
increase (decrease) in money wage rate 
This appendix deals with the process whereby a once and for all 
increase (decrease) in money wage rate, such that all gross profit margins 
are squeezed (increased) but not reduced to zero, leads the economy to 
higher (lower) equilibrium levels of employment and output with all 
commodity prices controlled (or freezed). The conclusions arrived at can 
in principle help in handling (or worsening) the problem of unemployment 
and poverty in advanced capitalist economies today. 
Outline: 
(1) Introductory note 
(2) Assumptions and some concepts 
(3) Analysis 
(4) Special cases 
(5) Summary and conclusions 
(6) Proofs and some reconciliations 
(1) Introductory note 
One of the important conclusions arrived at by Kalecki and Keynes is 
that an increase in investment expenditure by Al generates a series of 
incomes and savings such that the equilibrium increase in real national 
income generates an amount of savings, AS, exactly equal to the initial ??7 
Appendix 8 
The aim of this appendix is to extend equations 8.29-8.33 of 
chapter 8 such that the fractional production period is taken into 
consideration. 
(1) Assumptions: the assumptions upon which the following 
derivations rest are the following: (a) all inputs, whether of 
initial entry or of progressively added nature, enter the production 
line simultaneously; (b) the units of the progressively added input 
are applied in equal batches at the beginning of each time interval; 
and (c) the wage rate is fixed before the beginning of period t . 
Once the money wage rate is fixed, all live labour will be priced at 
the newly fixed money wage rate. 
(2) Diagrams: From the above assumption the following two simple 
diagrams follow: 355 
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